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Mon, Dec 6, 1999
Rick Brainard - your About.com Guide to:
18th Century History
On War
by General Carl von Clausewitz
Volume I
TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM
{1874 was 1st edition of this translation. 1909 was the London reprinting.}
Chapter 2 END AND MEANS IN WAR
HAVING in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated
and variable nature of War, we shall now occupy ourselves in
examining into the influence which this nature has upon the end
and means in War.
If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the whole effort
of War is to be directed, in order that it may suffice for the
attainment of the political object, we shall find that it is just as
variable as are the political object and the particular
circumstances of the War.
If, in the next place, we keep once more to the pure conception
of War, then we must say that the political object properly lies
out of its province, for if War is an act of violence to compel the
enemy to fulfil our will, then in every case all depends on our
overthrowing the enemy, that is, disarming him, and on that alone.
This object, developed from abstract conceptions, but which is
also the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality, we shall, in
the first place, examine in this reality.
In connection with the plan of a campaign we shall hereafter
examine more closely into the meaning of disarming a nation, but
here we must at once draw a distinction between three things,
which, as three general objects, comprise everything else within
them. They are the MILITARY POWER, THE COUNTRY,
and THE WILL OF THE ENEMY.
The military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a
state as not to be able to prosecute the War. This is the sense in
which we wish to be understood hereafter, whenever we use the
expression destruction of the enemy's military power.
The country must be conquered, for out of the country a new
military force may be formed.
But even when both these things are done, still the War, that is,
the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be
considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not
subdued also; that is, its Government and its Allies must be
forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission; for
whilst we are in full occupation of the country, the War may
break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given
by Allies. No doubt, this may also take place after a peace, but
that shows nothing more than that every War does not carry in
itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement.
But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion of peace a
number of sparks are always extinguished which would have
smouldered on quietly, and the excitement of the passions abates,
because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in
all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great
number, turn themselves away completely from the road to
resistance. Whatever may take place subsequently, we must
always look upon the object as attained, and the business of War
as ended, by a peace.
As protection of the country is the primary object for which the
military force exists, therefore the natural order is, that first of all
this force should be destroyed, then the country subdued; and
through the effect of these two results, as well as the position we
then hold, the enemy should be forced to make peace. Generally
the destruction of the enemy's force is done by degrees, and in
just the same measure the conquest of the country follows
immediately. The two likewise usually react upon each other,
because the loss of provinces occasions a diminution of military
force. But this order is by no means necessary, and on that
account it also does not always take place. The enemy's Army,
before it is sensibly weakened, may retreat to the opposite side of
the country, or even quite outside of it. In this case, therefore, the
greater part or the whole of the country is conquered.
But this object of War in the abstract, this final means of attaining
the political object in which all others are combined, the
DISARMING THE ENEMY, is rarely attained in practice and is
not a condition necessary to peace. Therefore it can in no wise be
set up in theory as a law. There are innumerable instances of
treaties in which peace has been settled before either party could
be looked upon as disarmed; indeed, even before the balance of
power had undergone any sensible alteration. Nay, further, if we
look at the case in the concrete, then we must say that in a whole
class of cases, the idea of a complete defeat of the enemy would
be a mere imaginative flight, especially when the enemy is
considerably superior.
The reason why the object deduced from the conception of War
is not adapted in general to real War lies in the difference
between the two, which is discussed in the preceding chapter. If it
was as pure theory gives it, then a War between two States of
very unequal military strength would appear an absurdity;
therefore impossible. At most, the inequality between the physical
forces might be such that it could be balanced by the moral
forces, and that would not go far with our present social condition
in Europe. Therefore, if we have seen Wars take place between
States of very unequal power, that has been the case because
there is a wide difference between War in reality and its original
conception.
There are two considerations which as motives may practically
take the place of inability to continue the contest. The first is the
improbability, the second is the excessive price, of success.
According to what we have seen in the foregoing chapter, War
must always set itself free from the strict law of logical necessity,
and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities; and as this is so
much the more the case, the more the War has a bias that way,
from the circumstances out of which it has arisen--the smaller its
motives are, and the excitement it has raised--so it is also
conceivable how out of this calculation of probabilities even
motives to peace may arise. War does not, therefore, always
require to be fought out until one party is overthrown; and we
may suppose that, when the motives and passions are slight, a
weak probability will suffice to move that side to which it is
unfavourable to give way. Now, were the other side convinced of
this beforehand, it is natural that he would strive for this
probability only, instead of first wasting time and effort in the
attempt to achieve the total destruction of the enemy's Army.
Still more general in its influence on the resolution to peace is the
consideration of the expenditure of force already made, and
further required. As War is no act of blind passion, but is
dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that
object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to
be purchased. This will be the case, not only as regards extent,
but also as regards duration. As soon, therefore, as the required
outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer
equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the
result.
We see, therefore, that in Wars where one side cannot
completely disarm the other, the motives to peace on both sides
will rise or fall on each side according to the probability of future
success and the required outlay. If these motives were equally
strong on both sides, they would meet in the centre of their
political difference. Where they are strong on one side, they might
be weak on the other. If their amount is only sufficient, peace will
follow, but naturally to the advantage of that side which has the
weakest motive for its conclusion. We purposely pass over here
the difference which the POSITIVE and NEGATIVE character
of the political end must necessarily produce practically; for
although that is, as we shall hereafter show, of the highest
importance, still we are obliged to keep here to a more general
point of view, because the original political views in the course of
the War change very much, and at last may become totally
different, JUST BECAUSE THEY ARE DETERMINED BY
RESULTS AND PROBABLE EVENTS.
Now comes the question how to influence the probability of
success. In the first place, naturally by the same means which we
use when the object is the subjugation of the enemy, by the
destruction of his military force and the conquest of his provinces;
but these two means are not exactly of the same import here as
they would be in reference to that object. If we attack the
enemy's Army, it is a very different thing whether we intend to
follow up the first blow with a succession of others, until the
whole force is destroyed, or whether we mean to content
ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's feeling of security,
to convince him of our superiority, and to instil into him a feeling
of apprehension about the future. If this is our object, we only go
so far in the destruction of his forces as is sufficient. In like
manner, the conquest, of the enemy's provinces is quite a different
measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's Army.
In the latter case the destruction of the Army is the real effectual
action, and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it;
to take them before the Army had been defeated would always
be looked upon only as a necessary evil. On the other hand, if
our views are not directed upon the complete destruction of the
enemy's force, and if we are sure that the enemy does not seek
but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking
possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage in
itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make the
enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it may also be
regarded as a shorter road to peace.
But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the
probability of the result without destroying the enemy's Army,
namely, upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with
political views. If there are any enterprises which are particularly
likely to break up the enemy's alliances or make them inoperative,
to gain new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in our
own favour, &c. &c., then it is easy to conceive how much these
may increase the probability of success, and become a shorter
way towards our object than the routing of the enemy's forces.
The second question is how to act upon the enemy's expenditure
in strength, that is, to raise the price of success.
The enemy's outlay in strength lies in the WEAR AND TEAR of
his forces, consequently in the DESTRUCTION of them on our
part, and in the LOSS of PROVINCES, consequently the
CONQUEST of them by us.
Here, again, on account of the various significations of these
means, so likewise it will be found that neither of them will be
identical in its signification in all cases if the objects are different.
The smallness in general of this difference must not cause us
perplexity, for in reality the weakest motives, the finest shades of
difference, often decide in favour of this or that method of
applying force. Our only business here is to show that, certain
conditions being supposed, the possibility of attaining our purpose
in different ways is no contradiction, absurdity, nor even error.
Besides these two means, there are three other peculiar ways of
directly increasing the waste of the enemy's force. The first is
INVASION, that is THE OCCUPATION OF THE ENEMY'S
TERRITORY, NOT WITH A VIEW TO KEEPING IT, but in
order to levy contributions upon it, or to devastate it.
The immediate object here is neither the conquest of the enemy's
territory nor the defeat of his armed force, but merely to DO
HIM DAMAGE IN A GENERAL WAY. The second way is to
select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we
can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than
two different directions in which our force may be employed, the
first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the
enemy's Army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat
of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode
of speaking, we should say that the first is primarily military, the
other more political. But if we take our view from the highest
point, both are equally military, and neither the one nor the other
can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case. The
third, by far the most important, from the great number of cases
which it embraces, is the WEARING OUT of the enemy. We
choose this expression not only to explain our meaning in few
words, but because it represents the thing exactly, and is not so
figurative as may at first appear. The idea of wearing out in a
struggle amounts in practice to A GRADUAL EXHAUSTION
OF THE PHYSICAL POWERS AND OF THE WILL BY
THE LONG CONTINUANCE OF EXERTION.
Now, if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration of the
contest, we must content ourselves with as small objects as
possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end requires
a greater expenditure of force than a small one; but the smallest
object that we can propose to ourselves is simple passive
resistance, that is a combat without any positive view. In this way,
therefore, our means attain their greatest relative value, and
therefore the result is best secured. How far now can this
negative mode of proceeding be carried? Plainly not to absolute
passivity, for mere endurance would not be fighting; and the
defensive is an activity by which so much of the enemy's power
must be destroyed that he must give up his object. That alone is
what we aim at in each single act, and therein consists the
negative nature of our object.
No doubt this negative object in its single act is not so effective as
the positive object in the same direction would be, supposing it
successful; but there is this difference in its favour, that it succeeds
more easily than the positive, and therefore it holds out greater
certainty of success; what is wanting in the efficacy of its single
act must be gained through time, that is, through the duration of
the contest, and therefore this negative intention, which constitutes
the principle of the pure defensive, is also the natural means of
overcoming the enemy by the duration of the combat, that is of
wearing him out.
Here lies the origin of that difference of OFFENSIVE and
DEFENSIVE, the influence of which prevails throughout the
whole province of War. We cannot at present pursue this subject
further than to observe that from this negative intention are to be
deduced all the advantages and all the stronger forms of combat
which are on the side of the Defensive, and in which that
philosophical-dynamic law which exists between the greatness
and the certainty of success is realised. We shall resume the
consideration of all this hereafter.
If then the negative purpose, that is the concentration of all the
means into a state of pure resistance, affords a superiority in the
contest, and if this advantage is sufficient to BALANCE whatever
superiority in numbers the adversary may have, then the mere
DURATION of the contest will suffice gradually to bring the loss
of force on the part of the adversary to a point at which the
political object can no longer be an equivalent, a point at which,
therefore, he must give up the contest. We see then that this class
of means, the wearing out of the enemy, includes the great
number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger.
Frederick the Great, during the Seven Years' War, was never
strong enough to overthrow the Austrian monarchy; and if he had
tried to do so after the fashion of Charles the Twelfth, he would
inevitably have had to succumb himself. But after his skilful
application of the system of husbanding his resources had shown
the powers allied against him, through a seven years' struggle, that
the actual expenditure of strength far exceeded what they had at
first anticipated, they made peace.
We see then that there are many ways to one's object in War;
that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in
every case; that the destruction of the enemy's military force, the
conquest of the enemy's provinces, the mere occupation of them,
the mere invasion of them--enterprises which are aimed directly
at political objects--lastly, a passive expectation of the enemy's
blow, are all means which, each in itself, may be used to force the
enemy's will according as the peculiar circumstances of the case
lead us to expect more from the one or the other. We could still
add to these a whole category of shorter methods of gaining the
end, which might be called arguments ad hominem. What branch
of human affairs is there in which these sparks of individual spirit
have not made their appearance, surmounting all formal
considerations? And least of all can they fail to appear in War,
where the personal character of the combatants plays such an
important part, both in the cabinet and in the field. We limit
ourselves to pointing this out, as it would be pedantry to attempt
to reduce such influences into classes. Including these, we may
say that the number of possible ways of reaching the object rises
to infinity.
To avoid under-estimating these different short roads to one's
purpose, either estimating them only as rare exceptions, or
holding the difference which they cause in the conduct of War as
insignificant, we must bear in mind the diversity of political objects
which may cause a War-- measure at a glance the distance which
there is between a death struggle for political existence and a War
which a forced or tottering alliance makes a matter of
disagreeable duty. Between the two innumerable gradations
occur in practice. If we reject one of these gradations in theory,
we might with equal right reject the whole, which would be
tantamount to shutting the real world completely out of sight.
These are the circumstances in general connected with the aim
which we have to pursue in War; let us now turn to the means.
There is only one single means, it is the FIGHT. However
diversified this may be in form, however widely it may differ from
a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand
encounter, whatever number of things may introduce themselves
which are not actual fighting, still it is always implied in the
conception of War that all the effects manifested have their roots
in the combat.
That this must always be so in the greatest diversity and
complication of the reality is proved in a very simple manner. All
that takes place in War takes place through armed forces, but
where the forces of War, i.e., armed men, are applied, there the
idea of fighting must of necessity be at the foundation.
All, therefore, that relates to forces of War--all that is connected
with their creation, maintenance, and application-- belongs to
military activity.
Creation and maintenance are obviously only the means, whilst
application is the object.
The contest in War is not a contest of individual against individual,
but an organised whole, consisting of manifold parts; in this great
whole we may distinguish units of two kinds, the one determined
by the subject, the other by the object. In an Army the mass of
combatants ranges itself always into an order of new units, which
again form members of a higher order. The combat of each of
these members forms, therefore, also a more or less distinct unit.
Further, the motive of the fight; therefore its object forms its unit.
Now, to each of these units which we distinguish in the contest
we attach the name of combat.
If the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every application of
armed power, then also the application of armed force in general
is nothing more than the determining and arranging a certain
number of combats.
Every activity in War, therefore, necessarily relates to the combat
either directly or indirectly. The soldier is levied, clothed, armed,
exercised, he sleeps, eats, drinks, and marches, all MERELY TO
FIGHT AT THE RIGHT TIME AND PLACE.
If, therefore, all the threads of military activity terminate in the
combat, we shall grasp them all when we settle the order of the
combats. Only from this order and its execution proceed the
effects, never directly from the conditions preceding them. Now,
in the combat all the action is directed to the DESTRUCTION of
the enemy, or rather of HIS FIGHTING POWERS, for this lies
in the conception of combat. The destruction of the enemy's
fighting power is, therefore, always the means to attain the object
of the combat.
This object may likewise be the mere destruction of the enemy's
armed force; but that is not by any means necessary, and it may
be something quite different. Whenever, for instance, as we have
shown, the defeat of the enemy is not the only means to attain the
political object, whenever there are other objects which may be
pursued as the aim in a War, then it follows of itself that such
other objects may become the object of particular acts of
Warfare, and therefore also the object of combats.
But even those combats which, as subordinate acts, are in the
strict sense devoted to the destruction of the enemy's fighting
force need not have that destruction itself as their first object.
If we think of the manifold parts of a great armed force, of the
number of circumstances which come into activity when it is
employed, then it is clear that the combat of such a force must
also require a manifold organisation, a subordinating of parts and
formation. There may and must naturally arise for particular parts
a number of objects which are not themselves the destruction of
the enemy's armed force, and which, while they certainly
contribute to increase that destruction, do so only in an indirect
manner. If a battalion is ordered to drive the enemy from a rising
ground, or a bridge, &c., then properly the occupation of any
such locality is the real object, the destruction of the enemy's
armed force which takes place only the means or secondary
matter. If the enemy can be driven away merely by a
demonstration, the object is attained all the same; but this hill or
bridge is, in point of fact, only required as a means of increasing
the gross amount of loss inflicted on the enemy's armed force. It
is the case on the field of battle, much more must it be so on the
whole theatre of war, where not only one Army is opposed to
another, but one State, one Nation, one whole country to
another. Here the number of possible relations, and consequently
possible combinations, is much greater, the diversity of measures
increased, and by the gradation of objects, each subordinate to
another the first means employed is further apart from the ultimate
object.
It is therefore for many reasons possible that the object of a
combat is not the destruction of the enemy's force, that is, of the
force immediately opposed to us, but that this only appears as a
means. But in all such cases it is no longer a question of complete
destruction, for the combat is here nothing else but a measure of
strength--has in itself no value except only that of the present
result, that is, of its decision.
But a measuring of strength may be effected in cases where the
opposing sides are very unequal by a mere comparative estimate.
In such cases no fighting will take place, and the weaker will
immediately give way.
If the object of a combat is not always the destruction of the
enemy's forces therein engaged--and if its object can often be
attained as well without the combat taking place at all, by merely
making a resolve to fight, and by the circumstances to which this
resolution gives rise-- then that explains how a whole campaign
may be carried on with great activity without the actual combat
playing any notable part in it.
That this may be so military history proves by a hundred
examples. How many of those cases can be justified, that is,
without involving a contradiction and whether some of the
celebrities who rose out of them would stand criticism, we shall
leave undecided, for all we have to do with the matter is to show
the possibility of such a course of events in War.
We have only one means in War--the battle; but this means, by
the infinite variety of paths in which it may be applied, leads us
into all the different ways which the multiplicity of objects allows
of, so that we seem to have gained nothing; but that is not the
case, for from this unity of means proceeds a thread which assists
the study of the subject, as it runs through the whole web of
military activity and holds it together.
But we have considered the destruction of the enemy's force as
one of the objects which maybe pursued in War, and left
undecided what relative importance should be given to it amongst
other objects. In certain cases it will depend on circumstances,
and as a general question we have left its value undetermined. We
are once more brought back upon it, and we shall be able to get
an insight into the value which must necessarily be accorded to it.
The combat is the single activity in War; in the combat the
destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end; it
is so even when the combat does not actually take place, because
in that case there lies at the root of the decision the supposition at
all events that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt.
It follows, therefore, that the destruction of the enemy's military
force is the foundation-stone of all action in War, the great
support of all combinations, which rest upon it like the arch on its
abutments. All action, therefore, takes place on the supposition
that if the solution by force of arms which lies at its foundation
should be realised, it will be a favourable one. The decision by
arms is, for all operations in War, great and small, what cash
payment is in bill transactions. However remote from each other
these relations, however seldom the realisation may take place,
still it can never entirely fail to occur.
If the decision by arms lies at the foundation of all combinations,
then it follows that the enemy can defeat each of them by gaining
a victory on the field, not merely in the one on which our
combination directly depends, but also in any other encounter, if it
is only important enough; for every important decision by arms
--that is, destruction of the enemy's forces--reacts upon all
preceding it, because, like a liquid element, they tend to bring
themselves to a level.
Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears,
therefore, always as the superior and more effectual means, to
which all others must give way.
It is, however, only when there is a supposed equality in all other
conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's
armed force the greater efficacy. It would, therefore, be a great
mistake to draw the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain
the victory over skill and caution. An unskilful attack would lead
to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's force, and
therefore is not what is here meant. The superi
Bibliography
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Word Count: 4830
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